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Research Summary
Public interest and policy debates surrounding the role of the Internet in terrorist activi-
ties is increasing. Criminology has said very little on the matter. By using a unique data
set of 223 convicted United Kingdom–based terrorists, this article focuses on how they
used the Internet in the commission of their crimes. As most samples of terrorist offenders
vary in terms of capabilities (lone-actor vs. group offenders) and criminal sophistica-
tion (improvised explosive devices vs. stabbings), we tested whether the affordances
they sought from the Internet significantly differed. The results suggest that extreme-
right-wing individuals, those who planned an attack (as opposed to merely providing
material support), conducted a lethal attack, committed an improvised explosive device
(IED) attack, committed an armed assault, acted within a cell, attempted to recruit
others, and engaged in nonvirtual network activities and nonvirtual place interactions
were significantly more likely to learn online compared with those who did not engage
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in these behaviors. Those undertaking unarmed assaults were significantly less likely to
display online learning. The results also suggested that extreme-right-wing individuals
who perpetrated an IED attack, associated with a wider network, attempted to recruit
others, and engaged in nonvirtual network activities and nonvirtual place interactions
were significantly more likely to communicate online with co-ideologues.
Policy Implications
Collectively the results provide insight into violent radicalization as a whole and not
just into violent online radicalization. The results also largely confirm the results found
in von Behr, Reding, Edwards, and Gribbon (2013) and in Gill and Corner (2015).
The current study and the two previous studies have tackled these questions by using
numerous methodological approaches and data sources and have arrived at similar
conclusions. The Internet is largely a facilitative tool that affords greater opportunities
for violent radicalization and attack planning. Nevertheless, radicalization and attack
planning are not dependent on the Internet, and policy needs to look at behavior,
intentions, and capabilities and not just at beliefs. From a risk assessment perspective,
the study also highlights the fact that there is no easy offline versus online violent
radicalization dichotomy to be drawn. It may be a false dichotomy. Plotters regularly
engage in activities in both domains. Often their behaviors are compartmentalized
across these two domains. Threat management policies would do well to understand the
individuals’ breadth of interactions rather than relying on a dichotomous understanding
of offline versus online, which represent two extremes of a spectrum that regularly provide
prototypical examples in reality. A preoccupation with only checking online behaviors
may lead an intelligence analyst to miss crucial face-to-face components of a plot’s
technical development or a perpetrator’s motivation. Policy and practice may benefit
from adopting insights from emerging research arguing in favor of disaggregating our
conception of the “terrorist” into discrete groups (e.g., foreign fighters vs. homegrown
fighters, bomb-makers vs. bomb-planters, and group-actors vs. lone-actors; Gill and
Corner, 2013; LaFree, 2013) rather than disaggregating the radicalization process
into discrete groups (e.g., online radicalization and prison radicalization). We need
to understand the drives, needs, and forms of behavior that led to the radicalization
and attack planning and why the offender chose that environment rather than purely
looking at the affordances the environment produced. By looking at the Internet as
an affordance opportunity that some forms of terrorist or terrorist violence require
more than others do, the focus is shifted from the radicalization process toward an
understanding of how crimes are committed. In other words, we are looking at crime
events rather than at the underlying dispositions behind the criminality.
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Public interest and policy debates surrounding the role of the Internet in terroristactivities is increasing. Yet, rigorous, criminologically informed research has said verylittle on the matter. Of the largely theoretical and anecdotal literature on terrorist
use of the Internet, studies generally have presented accounts on the affordances1 offered
by the Internet to terrorist groups, including virtual community building, mobilization,
information provision, virtual training, propaganda dissemination, recruitment, financing,
and risk mitigation (Holt, Freilich, Chermak, and McCauley, 2015; Rudner, 2016; Tsfati
andWeimann, 2002;Weimann, 2006). Such accounts implicitly have viewed the interaction
between the Internet and the user as unidirectional; exposure to Internet content may cause
behavior change.
These accounts, however, have lacked an acknowledgment that not every potential
user will make use of the affordance, nor will they use it in the same way. The degree
to which an individual makes use of the affordance is modulated based on their goals,
plans, values, beliefs, and experiences (Norman, 1988). For example, one may be aware
of the affordances provided by Internet-based retailers when buying books but rarely use
it, preferring the bookstore next door for a variety of practical and personal reasons. This
shifts the focus from the Internet as a potentially causal factor to a focus on how individuals
use the Internet based on their motivations, needs, expectations, and histories. As such, it
embodies situational crime prevention (SCP) perspectives that presume rational terrorists
actively scan, consume, and process information that they need to commit an offense. The
real-world absence of these factors drives the need to seek such information online. The
interaction between the Internet and the user is a two-way, person–situation interactive
process in which the offender leads the way. Whereas affordances are concerned with what
the environment offers the person, SCP is more concerned with what the person draws
from the environment (Wortley, 2012).
As most samples of terrorist offenders vary in terms of capabilities (lone-actor vs.
group-actors) and criminal sophistication (improvised explosive devices vs. stabbings), their
constituent needs and preferences may differ with regard to the affordances they seek
from the Internet. We would therefore expect to see significant differences in the Internet
affordances used by distinct subsets of terrorist offenders. This focus on distinct subsets
of terrorist offenders also adheres to traditional criminological approaches that split the
outcome variable across crime types, or offender types (e.g., violent vs. nonviolent), rather
than treating all terrorists in an aggregated manner as is typical within terrorism studies
(Monahan, 2012).
In the absence of empirical data, we cannot begin to disaggregate the complexity of
terrorist use of the Internet in a scientifically rigorous way. By using a unique data set of
1. As regularly mentioned within Internet studies, and more recently in crime (Garwood, 2011) and
terrorism-oriented publications (Taylor and Currie, 2012), an affordance provides opportunities to
potential users.
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223 convicted United Kingdom–based terrorists, this article addresses the lacuna in the
existing literature. We first outline with descriptive statistics the degree to which various
online activities related to radicalization and attack planningwere present.We then report on
a series of bivariate and multivariate analyses examining whether those interacting virtually
with like-minded individuals or learning online exhibit markedly different experiences (e.g.,
radicalization, event preparation, and attack outcomes) than those who do not. The next
section positions our article within the few existing empirically driven studies on this topic.
Existing Literature
An exhaustive search using dedicated academic research databases produced only three
data-driven studies about how convicted terrorists made use of the Internet. Von Behr et al.
(2013) examined 15 radicalized individuals, 9 of whom were convicted under U.K. terror-
ism legislation, which drew on interviews (with police and the individuals), trial records, and
computer registries.2 Their analysis suggested the Internet affordsmore prospects for radical-
ization in terms of being a “key source of information, communication and of propaganda
for their extremist beliefs” and provides a “greater opportunity than offline interactions
to confirm existing beliefs.” They depicted the Internet as “not a substitute for in-person
meetings but, rather, complements in-person communication” (2013: xi). They concluded
that interactions with others, be they physical or virtual, are still crucial for radicalization.
Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (2014) measured the degree to which lone-actor terrorists
engaged in online activities. Of 119 individuals, 35% interacted virtually with a wider
network of political activists, while 46% learned aspects of their attack method by using
virtual sources. Comparative analyses, which use inferential statistical methods, showed al-
Qaeda–inspired lone-actors were significantly more likely to learn through virtual sources
than were right-wing–inspired counterparts (65% vs. 37%). Isolated dyads were also signif-
icantly more likely to interact online with co-ideologues than were those who committed
their attacks alone.
By using a similar range of inferential statistical techniques, Gill and Corner (2015)
compared the behaviors and traits of lone-actor terrorists who either learned or interacted
with co-ideologues online with lone-actor terrorists who engaged in neither activity. They
found a growing trend among lone-actors to make use of the Internet. In other words,
although the Internet had not caused a growth in numbers of lone-actor terrorists, it altered
their means of radicalization and learning. The Internet, therefore, acts as a substitute for
other forms of communication but not necessarily as a force enabler. They also found
several variations in Internet behavior across subsets of terrorists. Younger offenders were
significantly more likely to engage in both virtual learning and virtual interaction than were
older offenders. Non–U.S.-based offenders were significantly more likely to learn through
2. Computer registries essentially log all activities conducted on a computer.
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virtual sources, which may be a function of U.S. offenders having greater access to firearms
and, therefore, not needing to go online to source these. They also found a significant
positive correlation existed between those who virtually interacted with co-ideologues and
those who interacted with co-ideologues face to face. Lone-actor radicalization is not,
therefore, a dichotomy of either offline or online but a dichotomy of interaction with others
versus no interaction with others.
Data andMethods
Violent Online Political Extremism Database
Data-driven studies on online radicalization have been rare. Even for a field as bereft of
empiricism as terrorism studies, the striking lack of data is surprising. As an illustration,
the first 200 abstracts from a Google Scholar search of “online radicalization OR online
radicalisation” shows only 6.5% used some form of data. Primary data existed in 2% of the
studies. These mostly focused on extremist forums and social media and, therefore, cap-
tured radicalized individuals (and not necessarily individuals prepared to engage in terrorist
acts).3
For this article, we set out to develop a database of terrorist offenders focused on
their online behaviors. To maximize the potential utility of this endeavor and its scientific
rigor, we considered several potential pitfalls. First, the initial goal of our study was to
examine those individuals who radicalized online. Nevertheless, if our study focused only
on individuals reportedly radicalized via the Internet, we could not look at the correlates of
terrorists’ decisions to use the Internet because the data would exclude cases in which the
perpetrator did not use the Internet. In other words, we would be unable to falsify our claims
or test hypotheses based on the arguments of the wider literature. Therefore, we decided
to build a database of terrorist actors and code for numerous Internet-related activities and
their presence or absence. By doing so, we could capture a continuum of Internet-inspired
actors from those who were completely uninspired to those who were fully inspired and
plot intervening positions.
This decision had implications for how far we could realistically spread our scope geo-
graphically and ideologically. Including those who radicalized offline necessitated tightening
the search in other areas to allow for the data collection needed to conduct this study. We
required our observation pool to be sufficiently large to allow for the application of infer-
ential statistical methods. We also decided the actor dictionary should be limited to a single
country to minimize potential open-source reporting bias and the need for cross-national
data. In other words, some countries may report (online) radicalization in different ways;
to avoid the vagaries of culturally distinct reporting methods, then, we settled on a single-
country focus. A single country with a sufficient number of terrorism cases was, therefore,
3. This search was conducted in May 2015.
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deemed the most appropriate choice. Access to open sources is the key to building such a
database, so English-language texts were crucial. This left us with two countries, the United
Kingdom and the United States. We chose the United Kingdom for two reasons: (1) prior
research by Gill and Corner (2015) showed higher levels of online behaviors in the U.K.
sample versus the U.S. sample of lone-actor terrorists and (b) terrorism actor dictionaries
were more available.
Individuals were identified through several preexisting actor dictionaries. Simcox, Stu-
art, and Ahmed’s (2010) study listed all al-Qaeda–inspired individuals convicted in the
United Kingdom. We updated this list to the end of 2014 and widened the scope to reflect
very early Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)-related activities. The data do not account
for the large wave of activities from 2014 to date connected with ISIS and its social me-
dia activity. Because of the addition of some early ISIS-related activity, we collapsed both
al-Qaeda- and ISIS-related actors into one Jihadist-inspired actor category for the analyses
that follow. We added additional extreme-right-wing names through tailored search strings
developed and applied to the LexisNexis “All English News” option. Although aggregated
to the single category of “extreme right wing,” these offenders are stratified across numerous
grievances, including anti-immigration, anti-government, anti-Muslim, and anti-Jewish.
Additional individuals were identified through the U.S. National Consortium for the Study
of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism’s (START) Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
Various publications on right-wing extremism in the United Kingdom and lone-actors
identified through previous studies (Gill et al., 2014) were also included. We decided to
limit the population to post-1990 events because large portions of our data were sourced
from the LexisNexis4 archive, which remains limited before 1990. Irish Republican actors
were also omitted from data collection as their online activities were rarely, if ever, men-
tioned in open-source reporting. Left-wing extremists were next to impossible to identify
in a rigorous manner because of the lack of existing research on this phenomenon and
because U.K. legislation tends to treat these offenders under criminal damage statutes. They
are, therefore, subsumed under a wider category of nonpolitically oriented offenders. We
restricted our scope to those who were either convicted in the United Kingdom or died
in the commission of a terrorist act in the United Kingdom. Foreign fighters in Syria and
elsewhere were therefore omitted.
In total, 223 offenders fit the geographical, temporal, and operational criteria for our
study. The variables spanned sociodemographic information (e.g., age, gender, occupation,
family characteristics, relationship status, occupation, and employment), network behaviors
(e.g., number of co-offenders and training location), event-specific behaviors (e.g., attack
method(s), target(s)), and post-event behaviors and experiences (e.g., claim(s) of responsi-
bility and arrest/conviction details). Data were collected on demographic and background
4. LexisNexis currently provides an electronic online archive from more than 20,000 global news sources.
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characteristics and radicalization-linked behaviors by examining and coding information
contained in open-source news reports, sworn affidavits, and when possible, publically avail-
able first-hand accounts. Most data were collected from press reports via tailored LexisNexis
searches. Additional information was gathered from online public record depositories (e.g.,
documentcloud.org), terrorist biographies, and relevant scholarly articles.
The variables related to online activities were developed in two stages. The first stage
emerged from Gill and colleagues’ previous lone-actor terrorism research (Gill and Corner,
2015; Gill et al., 2014). Gill et al. (2014) addressed two questions related to online behavior:
Did the individual learn about the attack plans from virtual sources? Did the individual
interact with co-ideologues online? Gill and Corner (2015) unpacked these two questions
further and outlined a series of illustrative examples to show that the types of learning and
interaction differed from case to case. The second stage involved an iterative coding process
that developed new questions as the data were collected and reviewed.
Two coders examined all available open-source information on each individual. In
cases where coders could not agree on the correct values for particular variables (e.g., one
coder marked it as a “yes” and one marked it as a “no”), differences were resolved based
on examination of the original sources that the coders relied on to make their assessments.
Such decisions factored into the comparative reliability and quality of the sources and the
sources cited in the report. To aid these decisions, each source was plotted on a continuum
of reliability. Court transcripts and associated documents were deemedmost reliable as these
documents recorded final judicial decisions. Competency evaluations, sworn affidavits, and
indictments were deemed reliable as these were carried out after arrest and before trial when
initial investigations had been made. Statements (verbal or written) by the terrorist/affiliated
group were deemed only somewhat reliable as there may be a drive for dishonesty. Warrants
and expert witness reports (in the context of trials) were also reasoned to be somewhat
reliable as warrants are produced prior to arrest and like expert witness reports are subject
to unreliability and bias. Media articles were then placed on a separate continuum within
the less reliable end of the spectrum, with personal opinion blogs at the least reliable end of
the scale and nontabloid newspapers at the most reliable.
Some limitations exist in the sources used. First, the sample only includes information
on individuals who planned or conducted attacks that led to convictions or death in the
perpetration of the attack. It does not include plots intercepted or disrupted by security forces
without a conviction. Second, data collection was limited to what could be collected from
open sources for each terrorist offender; police, intelligence, classified, and/or closed-source
files were unavailable to the researchers.
Third, it is often difficult to distinguish between missing data and variables that should
be coded as “no” or “not present.” Given the nature of newspaper and open-source reporting,
it is unrealistic to expect each biographically oriented story to contain lengthy passages that
list behaviors the offender did not engage in (e.g., the offender was not a substance abuser,
a former convict, or recently exposed to new media). Definitive “no” answers were a rarity
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(less than 5%) within the data collection process. This percentage was generally uniform
across most variables. Usually these “no” answers only occurred in response to incorrect
reporting earlier in the news cycle about a particular offender. If definitive “no” answers
were more prevalent, it would have been possible to consider using multiple missing data
imputationmethods (Scheffer, 2002). Current research by the first two authors in collabora-
tion with the Greater Manchester Police has suggested that regularly finding definitive “no”
answers necessitates access to closed-source data. Therefore, each variable in the analysis
is treated dichotomously (e.g., the response is either a “yes” or not enough information
to suggest a “yes” and, thus, a “no”). Unless otherwise stated, each percentage reported
is of the whole sample (N = 223). There is precedent for this in previous research on
attempted assassinations of public figures, fatal school shootings, and targeted violence af-
fecting higher education institutions and terrorism (Fein and Vossekuil, 1999; Gill et al.,
2014; Gruenewald, Chermak, and Freilich, 2014; Vossekuil, 2002).
Fourth, it was difficult to get consistently complete data on the temporal ordering of
the variables. This is usually because the behaviors are not reported in this manner within
our data sources (instead they are usually listed as present). Where possible, illustrative
examples of what these orderings looked like in various cases are presented.
Finally, although the level of available granular behavioral data were greater than for
some other types of issues that could be equally important (such as family upbringing or
other factors associated with exposure to extremist narratives), this granularity does not
go so far as to outline consistently the online spaces (e.g., websites, forums, and social
media platforms) relied on, exact information gathered online, or frequency of Internet
activity.
Despite these limitations, open-source accounts can provide rich data. This has been
validated in other studies focusing on the sociodemographic characteristics, operational
behaviors, and developmental pathways of members of formal terrorist organizations and
lone-actor terrorists (Gill and Horgan, 2013; Gill et al., 2014). Reporting (and, hence,
data availability) also tends to be richer when terrorism incidents are rare. For example,
Gill et al.’s (2014) study of lone-actor terrorists (N = 119 over a 22-year period) obtained
educational data on 65% of the sample, whereas in Gill and Horgan’s (2013) study of
provisional IRA members (N = 1,240 over a 29-year period), similar data were obtained on
less than 10% of the sample. Analogous research also has indicated accessible information
is more readily available in rare violent events (Duwe, 2000, 2005).
Methods
To compare those actors who engaged in online activities with those who did not, we
followed the procedures in Gruenewald et al. (2013). We first conducted a series of bivariate
tests such as chi-square analyses and, where appropriate, Fisher’s exact tests. The significant
differences between these subsets are discussed as follows. A series of odds ratios were then
calculated.
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Results
Descriptive Findings
The offenders captured in this database were overwhelmingly male (96%). They ranged in
age from 16 to 58 years old with a median age of 27, a mode of 22, and a mean of 28.
One third were unemployed at the time of their arrest/attack, a further one third worked in
the service or administrative sectors, and 14% were students. Twenty-two percent had some
university education. Half of the convictions were related to a planned attack, whereas the
other half were related to facilitative behaviors (e.g., financing or distributing propaganda).
Only 14% of the convictions were related to a completed attack. A total of 62% were
associated with a wider network of co-ideologues, 83% were associated with an attack
cell, 22% attended a terrorist training site, and 9% had front-line experience in foreign
insurgencies.
When turning attention to online activities, in 61% of cases, there was evidence of
online activity related to their radicalization and/or attack planning. As mentioned, we
disaggregated these behavior types, which are rank ordered by prevalence in the following
discussion.
Slightly more than half (54%) of all actors used the Internet to learn about some
aspect of their intended activity. Since 2012, this figure has increased to 76%, indicating
it is becoming more prevalent (even if the number of offenders year on year has not risen
substantially). This finding is perhaps unsurprising given the ubiquity of Internet usage in
most benevolent activities across wider society.
Extremist media were found or downloaded and subsequently reported on in open
sources for 44% of the perpetrators. In half of these cases (21%), the content was reportedly
videos with a smaller percentage reported for audio lectures (7%) and photographs (6%).
The content itself ranged broadly and included extremist-produced video montages of 9/11
and attacks on Western coalition forces in Iraq; beheadings and executions; crimes against
Muslims in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq; news footage of bombings; interviews with
and speeches by Anwar al-Awlaki, Osama bin Laden, Abu Hamza, and radical preachers;
pro-Jihad rallies; Jihadist texts; bomb-making instruction videos; and terrorist training
videos.
A third (32%) prepared for their attacks by using online resources. These included
bomb-making instruction videos; poison manuals; downloaded copies of Inspire mag-
azine; surveillance advice; an assassination guidebook; torture techniques; suicide vest
production; body disposal; plans for the London Underground, Buckingham Palace,
and other symbolic landmarks; military police voting records; and terrorist training
manuals.
At least 30% accessed extremist ideological content online. In many cases, arguably
too much material was downloaded for any one individual to consume and understand
thoroughly. One perpetrator had 17,779 computer files of ideological material, 1,152 of
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which contained extremist content. This may be typical for those individuals that download
materials in large volumes via BitTorrents.5
Slightly less than a third (29%) of actors communicated with other radicals virtually,
half of whom did so via e-mail (15%). Fewer actors communicated with others via online
discussion forums (8%) and chat rooms (9%). Some of these interactions circled around
the legitimacy of target selection. In one case, the interactions involved discussion of the
comparative legitimacy of targeting civilians as opposed to civil servants or the police.
In other cases, the interactions involved discussion of the intricacies of carrying out an
attack. For example, one case involved a detailed discussion around the making of the
highly explosive organic compound hexamethylene triperoxide diamine (HMTD)and how
to develop the correct concentration of hydrogen peroxide.
Fifteen percent of actors disseminated propaganda online. This content was usually
created by others and recirculated by the actors in our sample. Some of these individuals set
up specific websites for this purpose. For example, the administrators of the Aryan Strike
Force website are included in the offender data set. Others attempted to publish manuals
concerning firearms and explosives on the Internet to incite others.
Our results suggest that 14% of offenders opted to engage in violence after witnessing
something online. For example, on May 14, 2010, Roshonara Choudhry stabbed Stephen
Timms, a Labour Party Member of Parliament, causing him serious bodily injury. During
her police interview, Choudhry referred to a specific YouTube (YouTube, LLC, San Bruno,
CA) video of Sheikh Abdullah Azzam that made her understand that “even women are
supposed to fight” and that she had an obligation to engage in violence. According to police
interviews, Choudhry made this realization at some point in April and soon after began her
preparations for the attack. Unfortunately, data were sparse for the whole sample in terms
of measuring (a) the time between witnessing these videos and individuals’ decisions to take
action and (b) whether this was the first example of extremist content individuals witnessed
or the latest/most extreme in a long line of content.
One in ten of the sample used online resources to help overcome a hurdle they faced in
the actual planning of an attack. In June 2007, two individuals conducted coordinated car
bomb attacks in London and a follow-up attack at Glasgow International Airport when they
drove their Jeep Cherokee (a brand owned by Fiat Chrysler Automobiles, Auburn Hills,
MI) loaded with propane canisters into the terminal doors. They researched bomb-making
techniques online, including how to set off a bomb with a mobile phone, and later bought
some components online.
A small minority of individuals (9%) sought to recruit others online. Although a third
of the sample prepared for some aspect of their attacks online, 9% specifically chose their
target after conducting some online research. The analysis undertaken by police on one
5. A protocol that allows for transferring large amounts of data via peer-to-peer file sharing.
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T A B L E 1
Observed Percentages for Individuals Who Used Online Learning (All Cases)
Variable X² Value Sig. % Odds
Online Learning (Extreme Right Wing) 5.952 0.015 78.3 3.390
Planned Attack 4.180 0.041 60.9 1.739
Government Target 4.319 0.038 83.3 4.505
Killed Others in Event 7.906 0.005 100.0 —
IED Attack 16.724 0.000 72.5 3.348
Armed Assault 5.995 0.015 85.7 5.505
Unarmed Assault 4.832 0.028 0.0 —
Acted Within a Cell 6.259 0.012 50.5 0.378
Attempts to Recruit Others 7.507 0.006 84.2 5.029
Nonvirtual Network Activity 17.487 0.000 79.2 4.398
Nonvirtual Place Interaction 13.747 0.000 73.1 3.176
Note.—= No odds calculated because of complete lack of variance.
Jihadist-inspired plot showed that the plotters had used the Internet to research the English
Defence League (EDL), their activists, and the locations of its leader for up to a month
prior to the day of their planned bombing attack.
Six percent of perpetrators provided material support to others online, by asking
others to donate money to their cause or by selling The Anarchist Cookbook online, for
example. A very few (5%) sought legitimization for future actions from religious, social,
or political authority figures online; others did this indirectly by searching for fatwas and
other legitimating texts. One individual conducted the following Google searches: “three
places were [sic] you can kill someone in Islam” and “three place [sic] were [sic] you can kill
someone in Islam in punishment.”
Five percent also signaled online their plans to engage in attacks prior to the attack itself.
In most cases, it was only possible to identify whether the Internet was used. The number of
times actors used Internet sources or the hours spent online were impossible to determine.
Isolated cases do provide some insight, but this is variable and not generalizable. One actor
began researching bomb-making techniques weeks before engaging in his attack, whereas
others reportedly spent months on Internet research, with one actor spending possibly
6 hours a day watching extremist footage and videos. In most plots, we see many of these
outlined activities occurring at the same time.
Bivariate Analysis
First, we examined the differences between those who learned online and those who did
not. Table 1 outlines these results.
The bivariate results suggest that extreme-right-wing individuals, those who planned
an attack (as opposed to merely providing material support), conducted a lethal attack,
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committed an improvised explosive device (IED) attack, committed an armed assault, acted
within a cell, attempted to recruit others, and engaged in nonvirtual network activities and
nonvirtual place interactions were significantly more likely to learn online compared with
those who did not engage in these behaviors. Those undertaking unarmed assaults were
significantly less likely to display online learning. Odds ratios6 indicate extreme-right-wing
offenders were 3.39 times more likely to learn online than were Jihadist-inspired individuals.
This finding may be a function of the differing circumstances these ideological movements
experience in theUnited Kingdom. TheUnited Kingdom’s violent extreme-rightmovement
tends to use the Internet for recruitment, communication, and information dissemination
(Thornton, 2015), and compared with Jihadist-inspired lone-actors, extreme-right-wing
terrorist activity is more likely to be conducted online in the United Kingdom (Gill, 2015).
The bivariate results showed some interesting findings with regard to target choice.
Those who plotted to attack a government target (as opposed to the civilian population)
were 4.50 times more likely to learn online. Indeed 83% of those who plotted to attack
a government target displayed online learning traits. Given the additional security around
government targets (compared with civilian ones), it is a riskier and more arduous practice.
The need to go online and learn, therefore, is consistent with our thinking around how
different subsets of offenders use Internet affordances differently.
We also found evidence of differing utilization of affordances with regard to attack type.
Of all those who actually plotted an attack, those who used/planned to use an IED were
3.34 times more likely to have learned online. This reflects both the greater complexity
in IED manufacturing compared with other weapons coupled with the relative ease of
availability of online bomb-making manuals and YouTube videos that provide helpful
demonstrations. On the other hand, those who used more primitive attack types, like arson
or unarmed assaults, were significantly less likely to have learned online.
The bivariate analyses likewise found differing utilization of affordances with regard to
the offender’s immediate co-offending network. Lone-actors were 2.64 times more likely to
learn online than were members of a cell. This may be a reflection of the fact that within a
cell, there is a likely pooling of human, social, technical, and financial capital, the absence of
which leads individuals to go online to learn how to conduct attacks and for other purposes.
The corresponding finding that lone-actors who tried to recruit others (and failed) were
5.00 times more likely to have learned online also lends credence to this interpretation.
The evidence suggests that online learning was strongly correlated with face-to-face
interactions with co-ideologues. Those who learned online were 4.39 times more likely to
have experienced nonvirtual network activity and 3.17 timesmore likely to have experienced
nonvirtual place interaction. Of those who plotted an attack, the individuals who attended
training camps were also significantly more likely to have learned online. This finding
6. OR = (a × d) / (b × c), where a, b, c, and d are elements from the 2 × 2 chi-square contingency table.
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T A B L E 2
Observed Percentages for IndividualsWhoUsed Online Communication Across
Ideologies
Variable X² Value Sig. % Odds
Communication Online (Extreme Right) 4.090 0.043 47.8 2.417
Military Target 5.479 0.019 10.7 0.251
IED Attack 3.740 0.053 37.5 1.783
Knife Attack 5.331 0.021 0.0 —
Association With a Network 4.315 0.038 72.7 1.934
Attempts to Recruit Others 42.296 0.000 94.7 58.500
Nonvirtual Network Activity 18.011 0.000 58.2 3.891
Nonvirtual Place Interaction 12.776 0.000 46.3 2.997
Note.—= No odds calculated because of complete lack of variance.
confirms the earlier research of von Behr et al. (2013) and Gill and Corner (2015) and
may be a result of the compartmentalization of tasks noted by Gill (2015). For example,
individuals tend to learn about a specific necessary task online (e.g., bomb-making), but
then they find a different instrumentalization in their offline interactions with co-ideologues
(e.g., the justification of bombing a particular target).
Next, we examined the differences between those who communicated online and those
who did not. Table 2 outlines our results.
The bivariate results suggest that extreme-right-wing individuals who perpetrated an
IED attack, associated with a wider network, attempted to recruit others, and engaged
in nonvirtual network activities and nonvirtual place interactions were significantly more
likely to communicate online. In comparison, those targeting the military and using knife
attacks were significantly less likely to communicate online. This indicates a high level of
overlap between the online learning and online communication bivariate results.
Extreme-right-wing offenders were 2.41 times more likely to have communicated
online with co-ideologues than Jihadist-inspired individuals were. Again, this may be a
function of the differing circumstances of these ideological movements, as noted earlier.
Those who targeted the military were significantly less likely to have communicated
online. Only 7.4% of those who plotted against the military communicated online with co-
ideologues. This may run counter to our expectations regarding affordances. It is probably
a marker of greater operational security among these offenders.
The evidence also suggests that communicating with co-ideologues online was signif-
icantly more likely to have been accompanied by face-to-face interactions with nonviolent
co-ideologues. Those who communicated online were 3.89 times more likely to have experi-
enced nonvirtual network activity and 3.17 timesmore likely to have experienced nonvirtual
place interaction. Of those who plotted an attack, the individuals who attended training
camps were also significantly more likely to have communicated online.
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T A B L E 3
Comparisons of Instrumentality of Online Learning Across Ideologies
Variable B(SE) df Sig. Exp(B)
Accessing Ideological Content 0.505 (0.470) 1 0.282 1.658
Opting for Violence −1.089 (0.801) 1 0.174 0.337
Choosing Targets −0.316 (0.836) 1 0.705 0.729
Preparing an Attack 1.433 (0.496) 1 0.004*** 4.193
Overcoming Hurdles −0.916 (0.846) 1 0.279 0.400
Constant −2.715 (0.365) 1 0.000 0.066
Notes.+B value= extreme right wing more likely to demonstrate. –B value= Islamist more likely to demonstrate.
***p< .001.
Multivariate Analysis
The bivariate results highlighted that extreme-right-wing offenders were significantly more
likely to learn online than were Jihadist-inspired individuals. We hypothesized that the lack
of collective action within the extreme-right-wing movement in the United Kingdom may
lead individuals to seek answers online because they are not available offline. We therefore
conducted binary logistic regression analyses for the five different types of learning outlined
in the Data and Methods section to see which could significantly predict individuals as
right-wing extremists (Table 3). The results illustrate that the sole difference in terms of
the instrumentality of the learning was in attack preparation. Extreme-right-wing offenders
were 4.19 times more likely to use online learning for attack preparation. There was no
significant difference in terms of opting for violence, target choice, or overcoming hurdles.
Binary logistic regression analysis indicated that this disparity in online communica-
tions across ideologies was largely accounted for by extreme-right-wing offenders’ greater
propensity to use extremist online forums (Table 4). There was no difference in terms of
e-mail or chat room usage. The latter forms of communication were more likely to be used
for communication with (a) nonviolent radicals and (b) nonradicals. There was also no
difference in terms of extreme-right-wing actors’ propensity to communicate online with
other cell members or other terrorists. A final predictor of this disparity was extreme-right
offenders’ greater likelihood of having used the Internet to disseminate propaganda com-
pared with radical Jihadists. There was no significant difference in terms of reinforcing
prior beliefs, seeking legitimization for future actions, disseminating propaganda, providing
material support to others, or attack signaling.
Discussion and Conclusion
Collectively the results provide insight into violent radicalization as a whole and not just into
violent online radicalization. The results also largely confirm the results found in von Behr
et al. (2013) and in Gill and Corner (2015). The current study and the two previous studies
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T A B L E 4
Comparisons of Online Communication Across Ideologies
B (SE) df Sig. Exp(B)
Communication Methods
E-mail −0.544 (0.808) 1 0.501 0.580
Forum 1.345 (0.701) 1 0.055* 3.839
Chatroom −0.296 (0.924) 1 0.748 0.744
Other 0.748 (0.614) 1 0.223 2.112
Constant −2.327 (0.281) 1 0.000 0.098
Communication Outlet
Cell 0.090 (0.713) 1 0.900 1.094
Other terrorists 0.013 (0.674) 1 0.985 1.013
Other radicals −1.205 (0.594) 1 0.043** 0.300
Other nonradicals −1.286 (0.731) 1 0.083* 0.281
Constant −0.155 (0.968) 1 0.873 0.857
Instrumentality of Communication
Cell preparation −0.150 (0.642) 1 0.815 0.861
Reinforcing prior beliefs −0.883 (1.337) 1 0.509 0.414
Seeking legitimization for actions 0.645 (1.040) 1 0.535 1.906
Disseminating propaganda −1.881 (0.552) 1 0.001*** 0.152
Providing material support 20.369 (10702.953) 1 0.998 —
Attack signaling −0.557 (0.865) 1 0.519 0.573
Constant −20.087 (10702.953) 1 0.999 0.000
Notes.+B value= extreme right wing more likely to demonstrate. –B value= Islamist more likely to demonstrate.—= Exp(B)
not computed because of size.
*p< .05. **p< .01. ***p< .001.
have tackled these questions by using numerousmethodological approaches and data sources
and have arrived at similar conclusions. The Internet is largely a facilitative tool that affords
greater opportunities for violent radicalization and attack planning. Nevertheless, radicaliza-
tion and attack planning are not dependent on the Internet and researchers need to look at
behaviors, intentions, and capabilities. Offenders hampered by their co-offending environ-
ment or the ambitions of their plot are afforded opportunities online. We found significant
differences across targeting strategies, ideologies, network forms, and actors’ propensity to
engage in online learning and communication. Selection of harder targets was strongly
associated with online learning. Technically more difficult attacks such as IEDs led to
more online searching compared with primitive or simpler attacks. Lone-actors required
more online learning because they lacked the pooled human talent typically associated
with an attack cell. Extreme-right-wing offenders were more likely than Jihadist-inspired
offenders in the United Kingdom to learn and communicate online. This may be a result
of geography and the structural unavailability of co-offenders in their local area, as well as
of their increased likelihood of being “lone-actors.”
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This study also highlights the fact that there is no easy offline versus online violent
radicalization dichotomy to be drawn. It may be a false dichotomy. Plotters regularly engage
in activities in both domains. Often their behaviors are compartmentalized across these
two domains. For example, plotters may engage in face-to-face interaction regarding the
ideological legitimacy of their actions while engaging in virtual communication regarding
the technical specificity of bomb-making. Threat management policies would do well to
understand the individuals’ breadth of interactions rather than to rely on a dichotomous
understanding of offline versus online, which represent two extremes of a spectrum that
regularly provide prototypical examples in reality. A preoccupation with only checking
online behaviors may lead an intelligence analyst to miss crucial face-to-face components
of a plot’s technical development or a perpetrator’s motivation.
Perhaps policy debates in this area have been focused on the wrong things and in
the wrong place. Policy seems fixated on the location in which the radicalization played
out. We regularly see new proposals focused on different radicalization locales (e.g., on-
line, prison, university, school, or place of worship). Our results suggest that often online
and offline interactions go hand in hand. Policy and practice may benefit from adopting
insights from emerging research arguing in favor of disaggregating our conception of the
“terrorist” into discrete groups (e.g., foreign fighters vs. homegrown fighters, bomb-makers
vs. bomb-planters, and group-actors vs. lone-actors; Gill and Corner, 2013; LaFree, 2013)
rather than of disaggregating the radicalization process into discrete groups (e.g., online rad-
icalization and prison radicalization). We need to understand the drives, needs, and forms
of behavior that led to the radicalization and attack planning and why the offender chose
that environment rather than purely looking at the affordances the environment produced.
As illustrated throughout, cases in which all transactions were conducted online are rare.
Face-to-face interactions were still the key to the process for most actors even if they were
aware of, and made use of, the bounty of ideological and training material available online.
Indeed, much recent investigative reporting of ISIS recruitment of Western individuals has
highlighted the importance of face-to-face interactions via Skype (Microsoft Corporation,
Redmond, WA) and other online platforms (Callimachi, 2015; Erelle, 2015). Violent
radicalization should therefore be framed as cyber-enabled rather than as cyber-dependent
while underlining that enabling factors differ from case to case depending on need (i.e., who
or what to attack and what tactic to use) and circumstance (i.e., availability of co-offenders,
expertise, and ideology). The use of the Internet was largely for instrumental purposes
whether it was pre-attack (e.g., surveillance, learning, practice, or communication) or post-
attack (e.g., disseminating propaganda). There is little evidence to suggest that the Internet
was the sole explanation prompting actors to decide to engage in a violent act. Instead, it
was just one factor among many that helped crystallize motivation, intent, and capability
at the same time and place. Our results further suggest that many went online not to have
their beliefs changed but rather to have them reinforced. This falls in line with von Behr
et al.’s (2013) previously cited research. Take, for example, Ian Davison who in 2010 was
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the first Briton to be convicted for producing a chemical weapon (ricin). In the aftermath
of his trial (in which his son was also convicted on other offenses), police sources noted that
Davison’s “views developed over time. After going online he accessed websites and started
to look at places where those kinds of views were shared with other people.”
By looking at the Internet as an affordance opportunity that some forms of terrorist or
terrorist violence require more so than others, the focus is shifted from the radicalization
process toward an understanding of how crimes are committed. In other words, we are
looking at crime events rather than at the underlying dispositions behind the criminality.
This, of course, is the main thinking behind situational crime prevention approaches
(Clarke, 1980; Clarke andNewman, 2006). Not all situational crime prevention approaches
are easy to implement within the virtual realm where large social media organizations have
displayed resistance or apathy, until recently, to increase the effort and risk of radicalizers and
the radicalized to operate freely on their platforms. For example, see Twitter’s (Twitter, Inc.,
San Francisco, CA) ongoing battle with ISIS-related accounts (Berger and Perez, 2016).
Cooperation between these organizations and state bodies is crucial in combatting the
affordances provided to would-be terrorists. State policies may potentially need to reframe
this cooperation as a battle against opportunities for violence rather than as a battle against
expressions of radical ideas and thoughts, which has recently dominated discourse on both
sides of the Atlantic.
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